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Suing the Firearms Industry: A Case for 
Federal Reform 
Stephen P. Halbrook* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A wave of lawsuits against the firearms industry for criminal 
acts of third parties crested and substantially evaporated during 
the 1980s.  Primarily brought by individual plaintiffs, these suits 
alleged a variety of theories of negligence (including negligent 
design and marketing), strict liability for defective (actually 
nondefective) products, and ultra-hazardous activity.  Since the 
firearms at issue worked properly and were made and 
distributed lawfully, these cases were by and large dismissed as 
failing to allege cognizable claims.1 
While such individual actions continue to be brought and are 
usually dismissed,2 in the late 1990s municipalities began to 
 
* Attorney at Law, Fairfax, Virginia; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D. 
Philosophy, Florida State University.  Argued Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997) and other firearms cases in the Supreme Court.  Author of FIREARMS LAW 
DESKBOOK (West 2003) and three books on the right to bear arms.  See 
www.stephenhalbrook.com.  Copyright © 2004 by Stephen P. Halbrook. All rights 
reserved. 
 1 E.g., Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 759-60 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that 
there is no duty where crime victims had no special relation with manufacturers); Bennet 
v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (holding that there is no 
duty where no special relationship existed between gun manufacturer and person injured 
by misuse of gun); Riordan v. Intíl Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1985) (finding that a manufacturer of nondefective handgun had no duty to control 
distribution of product to general public).  But see Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 
1143, 1159 (Md. 1985) (finding liability for ìSaturday Night Specialî), superseded by MD. 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY ß 5-402(b) (2003). 
 2 E.g., Bloxham v. Glock Inc., 53 P.3d 196, 201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that 
ìother courts faced with similar issues have almost uniformly refused to impose any duty 
on businesses related to the legal use and distribution of firearms owed to those harmed 
by the misuse of those firearms.î); First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Engíg, Inc., 900 
S.W.2d 202, 205 (Ark. 1995) (finding no special relation between manufacturer and 
handgun purchaser); Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947, 953 (Md. 1999) (finding 
that the inherent danger of guns creates no duty of dealers to persons who may be 
harmed); Resteiner v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 566 N.W.2d 53, 54 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) 
(finding appeal to be vexatious and awarding attorneyís fees; suit involved stolen weapon 
used in murder).  See also TIMOTHY A. BUMANN, THE COMPENDIUM OF REPORTED UNITED 
STATES FIREARMS PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A SYNOPSIS OF CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST 
MANUFACTURERS AND SELLERS (1995). 
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bring similar lawsuits against the firearms industry.  The same 
theories continued to be alleged but a new one was added: public 
nuisance.  Under this theory, it is alleged that the firearms 
industry intentionally supplies the criminal market by 
manufacturing more firearms than lawful demand would 
support.  During 1998-2003, some thirty-three municipalities and 
counties filed suits against the firearms industry.3 
The following briefly analyzes some representative cases of 
the current litigation against the firearms industry, including 
discussion of the public nuisance theory and the effect on the 
constitutionally-guaranteed right to keep and bear arms.4  It 
then provides a detailed analysis of the Ninth Circuitís Ileto v. 
Glock Inc.5 decision, which pushes the envelope by basing its 
claim of wrongdoing on the marketing of guns to police 
departments in States with less strict firearm laws.  Lastly, this 
Article evaluates the provisions of the Protection of Lawful 
Commerce in Arms Act, which is pending in the United States 
Congress and would preempt these types of suits against the 
firearms industry. 
II. IS THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS A PUBLIC NUISANCE? 
Typical allegations made in the current wave of anti-
industry lawsuits are summarized in Camden County Board of 
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,6 as follows: 
[T]he manufacturers release into the market substantially 
more handguns than they expect to sell to law-abiding 
purchasers; the manufacturers continue to use certain 
distribution channels, despite knowing (often from specific 
crime-gun trace reports produced by the federal Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) that those channels regularly 
yield criminal end-users . . . .  The County makes no allegation 
that any manufacturer violated any federal or state statute or 
regulation governing the manufacture and distribution of 
firearms, and no direct link is alleged between any 
manufacturer and any specific criminal act.7 
 
 3 Litigation Against the Gun Industry, Violence Policy Ctr., 
http://www.vpc.org/litigate.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2004); Taxpayer Funded Reckless 
Lawsuits Against The Firearms Industry, Natíl Rifle Assoc., 
http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=147 (posted Aug. 19, 2003). 
 4 The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, ìA well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.î  For a current listing of State arms guarantees, see 
Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions, 
http://www1.law.ucla.edu/~volokh/beararms/statecon.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004). 
 5 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 6 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 7 Id. at 539. 
HALBROOK FINAL MAY 28 5/28/2004 4:19 PM 
13 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 7:11 
Actually, manufacturers become aware of traces when the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ìBATFî) requests 
information, but a mere trace request does not imply that any of 
the links in a distribution channel committed any wrongdoing or 
even that a crime was committed with the firearm traced.8  At 
any rate, the Third Circuit held that ìno New Jersey court has 
ever allowed a public nuisance claim to proceed against 
manufacturers for lawful products that are lawfully placed in the 
stream of commerce.î9  It added, ìTo extend public nuisance law 
to embrace the manufacture of handguns would be 
unprecedented under New Jersey state law and unprecedented 
nationwide for an appellate court.î10 
In Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc.,11 Floridaís Third 
District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of all theories of 
liability in Miami-Dade Countyís suit against the firearms 
industry.12  Noting that virtually all appellate decisions from 
other states precluded liability, the court relied on Florida 
precedent holding that liability does not exist where the firearm 
was not defective, its manufacture and distribution were 
consistent with state and federal law, and no duty was breached 
by the defendants.13  Penelas observed: 
The Countyís request that the trial court use its injunctive 
powers to mandate the redesign of firearms and declare that 
the appelleesí business methods create a public nuisance, is an 
attempt to regulate firearms and ammunition through the 
medium of the judiciary.  Clearly this round-about attempt is 
being made because of the Countyís frustration at its inability 
to directly regulate firearms, an exercise proscribed by section 
790.33, Florida Statutes (1999) which expressly preempts to 
 
 8 Traces frequently implicate nothing about the first retail purchaser, much less the 
licensee.  According to the U.S. Solicitor General:  ìIf the tracing process is successful, it 
will identify the first retail purchaser of the traced firearm; yet that person may have long 
since relinquished ownership of the weapon and may have no connection to the 
underlying crime.î  Brief for the Petitioner at 27, BATF v. City of Chicago, 537 U.S. 1229 
(2003) (No. 02-322) (internal citations omitted).  Indeed, ìbecause the agency requesting 
the trace does not inform ATF of whether possessors and their associates are ever 
indicted or convicted of any offense, ATF has no way of knowing whether the law 
enforcement agency requesting the trace believes the possessor or associate to have had 
any role in the crime.î  Id. at 10 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Finally, 
ìATF has informed this Office that approximately 30% of all trace requests do not tie the 
weapon to any individual possessor.î  Id. at 41. 
 9 Camden, 273 F.3d at 540. 
 10 Id. at 540-41.  See also City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 
419 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting liability of firearm manufacturers under negligence, 
negligent entrustment, and public nuisance theories for costs incurred by city associated 
with the criminal use of handguns). 
 11 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 12 Id. at 1044. 
 13 Id. (citing Trespalacios v. Valor Corp. of Fla., 486 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1986)) (finding no liability for shotgun). 
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the state legislature the entire field of firearm and ammunition 
regulation.  The Countyís frustration cannot be alleviated 
through litigation as the judiciary is not empowered to ìenactî 
regulatory measures in the guise of injunctive relief.14 
The court cited references for ìadditional discussions of the 
right to bear arms,î15 but did not explicitly quote Floridaís arms 
guarantee.16  Of course, where clear statutory grounds exist for a 
decision, courts prefer not to raise constitutional issues.  But in 
the final analysis, one wonders how the lawful manufacture and 
distribution of a constitutionally-guaranteed product could give 
rise to liability.17 
Several states have statutes which explicitly preempt 
municipal regulation of firearms or specifically prohibit 
municipalities from bringing actions of the type discussed here.18  
 
 14 Id. at 1045 (internal citations omitted). 
 15 Id. at 1045 n.6. 
 16 Article I, Section 8 of the Florida Constitution provides: ìThe right of the people to 
keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority of the state shall 
not be infringed . . . .î 
 17 Long before the rise of suits against the manufacturers, suits seeking to impose 
liability on firearm owners for possessing or using firearms were held to be precluded by 
the existence of the right to bear arms.  See McKellar v. Mason, 159 So. 2d 700, 701-02 
(La. Ct. App. 1964) (holding that an elderly manís use of firearm in self-defense did not 
expose him to liability, and stating that, ìThe Constitutions of the United States and 
Louisiana give us the right to keep and bear arms.  It follows, logically, that to keep and 
bear arms gives us the right to use the arms for the intended purpose for which they were 
manufactured.î); Lopez v. Chewiwie, 186 P.2d 512, 513 (N.M. 1947) (holding that parent 
who kept loaded firearm in home with unattended child is not liable for tort committed by 
minor, relying in part on the state constitutional right to bear arms).  Of course, a parent 
may be liable for negligence.  E.g., Kuhns v. Brugger, 135 A.2d 395, 404 (Pa. 1957) 
(holding that, ìcommon prudence, in behalf of self-protection, justified the possession of 
the pistol for immediate use at night,î but owner negligent to absent himself and leave it 
ìin a place frequented by young children.î). 
 18 As an example, Florida provides: 
(1) Preemption.ñ Except as expressly provided by general law, the Legislature 
hereby declares that it is occupying the whole field of regulation of firearms 
and ammunition, including the purchase, sale, transfer, taxation, manufacture, 
ownership, possession, and transportation thereof, to the exclusion of all 
existing and future county, city, town, or municipal ordinances or regulations 
relating thereto.  Any such existing ordinances are hereby declared null and 
void . . . . 
. . . . 
(3) Policy and intent. ñ (a) It is the intent of this section to provide uniform 
firearms laws in the state; to declare all ordinances and regulations null and 
void which have been enacted by any jurisdictions other than state and federal, 
which regulate firearms, ammunition, or components thereof; to prohibit the 
enactment of any future ordinances or regulations relating to firearms, 
ammunition, or components thereof unless specifically authorized by this 
section or general law; and to require local jurisdictions to enforce state 
firearms laws. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. ß 790.33 (West 2000).  An example of the more recently passed 
preemption provisions which explicitly prohibit municipal lawsuits against the firearms 
industry is found in Louisiana: 
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Municipal suits against the firearms industry have been 
dismissed under such statutes; courts have ruled that 
municipalities have no due process rights which would negate 
such statutes.19  It has also been held that cities have no direct 
injury from criminal violence and, thus, have no standing to sue 
the firearms industry.20 
In Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. City of Atlanta,21 the Georgia 
Supreme Court held that all claims should be dismissed because 
the State preempted the field of gun regulation and also because 
a recent statute prohibited municipalities from bringing such 
suits.22  The court traced the source of the legislatureís authority 
directly to the stateís arms guarantee: 
Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VIII of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 
provides:  ìThe right of the people to keep and bear arms shall 
not be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have power to 
prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne.î  The 
General Assembly has exercised this power given by the 
Constitution to create a regulatory scheme for the distribution 
and use of firearms.23 
 
 A. The governing authority of any political subdivision or local or other 
governmental authority of the state is precluded and preempted from bringing 
suit to recover against any firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade 
association, or dealer for damages for injury, death, or loss or to seek other 
injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, 
marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition.  The authority to bring such 
actions as may be authorized by law shall be reserved exclusively to the state. 
B. This Section shall not prohibit the governing authority of a political 
subdivision or local or other governing authority of the state from bringing an 
action against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or 
dealer for breach of contract as to firearms or ammunition purchased by the 
political subdivision or local authority of the state. 
LA. REV. STAT. Ann. ß 40:1799 (West 2001). 
 19 E.g., Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 11 (La. 2001) (holding that the 
municipal suit was an indirect attempt to regulate lawful firearm manufacture, the state 
statute precluding such suits applied retroactively, and that municipalities have no due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); Mayor of Detroit v. Arms Tech., Inc., 
669 N.W.2d 845, 856-58 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the municipality lacked 
standing to contest the state preemption statute on due process grounds, and the statute 
did not violate separation of powers). 
 20 E.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 118 (Conn. 2001). 
 21 560 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). 
 22 Id. at 527, 531-32. 
 23 Id. at 529 (citing Rhodes v. R. G. Indus., Inc., 325 S.E.2d 465, 466 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1984)).  Rhodes in turn explained: 
Appellant first contends that ìthe trial court erred in holding as a matter of 
law that handguns are exempt from Georgiaís product liability law because the 
lack of safety connected with such weapons raises a political, nonjusticiable 
question.î  Her last contention is that the trial court erroneously held as a 
matter of law that the R.G. revolver is not unreasonably dangerous when 
marketed to the general public.  We disagree on both points.  The Second 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms, as does Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VIII of the Georgia Constitution 
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In several cases, courts have refused to grant motions to 
dismiss and the cases have proceeded to discovery.  Most were 
thereafter dismissed when discovery yielded no evidence 
supporting the allegations that the firearms industry 
intentionally and purposely distributed firearms to criminals.  
For instance, the trial-level Superior Court of Massachusetts 
characterized Bostonís public nuisance theory as ìunique in the 
Commonwealth,î but declined to dismiss the case on the 
pleadings.24  However, after nearly three years of litigation, 
Boston agreed to a dismissal of its lawsuit against the industry 
and even acknowledged that the industry had made 
commitments to safety.25  It would appear that Boston simply 
could not prove that the industry intentionally distributed 
firearms to criminals. 
The path of Cincinnatiís suit against the industry is 
intriguing.  The Ohio Constitution provides that ì[t]he people 
have the right to bear arms for their defense and security,î26 and 
the Ohio Supreme Court has reiterated that ìthe right to bear 
arms is fundamental.î27  However, when it came to deciding that 
a public nuisance action existed against the firearms industry, 
that right was not so much as mentioned.  In City of Cincinnati v. 
Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,28 the Court upheld the cause of action, 
stating: ìEven though there exists a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme involving the manufacturing, sales, and distribution of 
firearms, . . . the law does not regulate the distribution practices 
alleged in the complaint.î29 
Yet it was perhaps those allegations which would be the 
Achillesí heel of the plaintiffsí own case.  The Court remarked, 
ìWhile we do not predict the outcome of this case, we would be 
 
1983 . . . . 
Rhodes, 325 S.E.2d at 466. 
 24 City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 352, at *63-64 (July 13, 2000). 
 25 In dismissing its case, Boston and the industry agreed to a joint statement which 
stated in part: 
The City acknowledges that the members of the Industry and firearms trade 
associations are genuinely concerned with and are committed to, the safe, legal 
and responsible sale and use of their products. . . . The Industry and the City 
believe that through cooperation and communication they can continue to 
reduce the number of firearm related accidents, can increase awareness of the 
issues related to the safe handling and storage of firearms, and can reduce the 
criminal acquisition of firearms. 
Plaintiffsí Unopposed Motion to Dismiss, Ex. A at 3-4, City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson 
Corp., No. 99-02590-C (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2001). 
 26 OHIO CONST. art. I, ß 4. 
 27 Klein v. Leis, 795 N.E.2d 633, 636 (Ohio 2003). 
 28 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002). 
 29 Id. at 1143. 
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remiss if we did not recognize the importance of allowing this 
type of litigation to go past the pleading stages.î30  After the case 
was remanded for trial and discovery was completed, the City of 
Cincinnati voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit.31  Stanley Chesley, 
counsel for the City, advised that ìhe could not justify moving 
forward with the cityís 4-year-old lawsuit against the gun 
industry, dealing a major disappointment to gun control 
advocates across the nation.î32  Lawrence Keane, counsel for the 
National Shooting Sports Foundation, stated: ìëThe city canít 
prove the allegations, because theyíre not true . . . .  Theyíre 
unbelievably offensive, outrageous and patently false.î33  Thus, 
Cincinnatiís lawsuit went the way of Bostonísódown the tubes. 
The most active litigation against the firearms industry has 
undoubtedly proceeded before federal Judge Jack Weinstein of 
the Eastern District of New York.  In these cases he frequently 
allows causes of action to go forward against the gun 
manufacturers on multiple theories, despite consistent reversal 
by the Second Circuit.  In Hamilton v. Accu-tek,34 an individual 
plaintiff suit against the industry, Judge Weinstein allowed 
claims of market share liability and negligence to go to the jury.35  
On appeal the Second Circuit certified questions to the New York 
Court of Appeals,36 which held that handgun manufacturers have 
no special duty to crime victims regarding the marketing of their 
products.37 
In NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc.,38 a public nuisance suit brought 
by a private association rather than a municipality, Judge 
Weinstein tried the claims before an advisory jury in Spring 
2003.  Meanwhile, the New York Appellate Division affirmed the 
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action of a similar public 
nuisance case against the industry, brought by New York State 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer.39  Nonetheless, in AcuSport, 
Judge Weinstein proceeded to render an opinion finding that the 
industryís distribution practices created a public nuisance, but 
 
 30 Id. at 1150-51. 
 31 Cincinnatiís Council Decides to Drop Suit Against Gun Makers, N.Y. TIMES, May 
1, 2003, at A24. 
 32 Gregory Krote, Drop Suit, City Advised, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 30, 2003, 
available at http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/04/30/loc_guncase30.html. 
 33 Id. 
 34 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y 1999), vacated sub nom., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 35 Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 835-36, 839. 
 36 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 37 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1059 (N.Y. 2001). 
 38 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 39 People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), appeal 
denied, 801 N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 2003). 
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that the private association plaintiff lacked standing because it 
did not suffer injury different in kind from that of the general 
public.40  Reaching the merits and then dismissing for lack of 
standing reversed the normal order of proceedingóif no standing 
exists, no reason exists to address the merits. 
Judge Weinsteinís holding that the industry is at fault was 
based in large part on the false equation of traced guns with 
ìcrime guns.î  He relied particularly on plaintiffís expert 
testimony that guns in the trace database were crime guns.41  Yet 
the court itself observed that ì[a] trace does not mean that the 
FFL retailer or the first purchaser engaged in illegal or wrongful 
activityî and that ì[p]laintiffís statistical experts . . . were unable 
to identify specific dealers who had committed wrongdoing.î42  
However, those facts did not prevent the firearm prohibitionist 
lobby from using the same trace data to compile a list of what 
they called the ten worst ìbad appleî gun dealers.43  Calling such 
assertions ìmisleading,î BATF responded: 
Many other factors ñ including high volume or sales; the type 
of inventory carried and whether the gun [dealer] is located in 
a high crime area ñ contribute to the percentages cited by the 
Brady campaign. 
. . . Gun traces, for example, indicate only that a gun has come 
to the attention of law enforcement.  They do not automatically 
implicate a dealer or purchaser in any wrongdoing. 
Large volume gun dealers will by their very frequency of sales 
have more guns come to the attention of law enforcement than 
a dealer who sells relatively few firearms.44 
 
 40 AcuSport, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 455. 
 41 Id. at 522. 
 42 Id. at 504. 
 43 Mark Bowes, Gun Reportís Worth at Issue: Misleading, ATF Says of Findings, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 28, 2003, at B1.  The media committed the same error.  
E.g., Katie Cornell Smith & Marianne Garvey, N.Y. Gun Shop Shoots to 3rd on Crime-
Weapon List, N.Y. POST, Apr. 18, 2003, at 17 (equating traced guns with ìcrime gunsî). 
 44 Press Release, ATF, Statement on Brady Campaign Allegations Regarding 
Federally Licensed Firearms Dealers (July 16, 2003) (on file with author).  The same 
statistics from the AcuSport litigation were later used in a publication by an organization 
calling itself ìAmericans for Gun Safetyî to support allegations such as ìChuckís Gun 
Shop ranked No. 1 in the nation among stores that sold firearms that turned up in 
criminalsí hands from 1996 to 2000.î  Frank Main, Gun-safety Group Names 4 Area 
Stores, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004, Special Ed., at 9, available at 
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-gun13.html.  However, as the article 
noted: 
The owner of Chuckís has never been charged with a crime. When the store 
applied for a new federal firearms license last year, the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives approved the request. 
ìThere was no evidence of any criminal wrongdoing that would prevent him 
from reapplying and getting a license,î ATF spokesman Tom Ahern said of 
Chuckís owner John Riggio . . . . 
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The extent to which information in trace records is subject to 
disclosure has been controversial.  Judge Weinstein ruled in the 
AcuSport litigation that BATF had to disclose trace records to 
plaintiffís experts but imposed a protective order ruling that the 
experts could make public only the number of traces and the 
identities of the licensees.45  Moreover, the end result of anti-
industry litigation by the City of Chicago is that such records are 
not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.46 
In dismissing AcuSport, Judge Weinstein briefly addressed 
the federal Second Amendment.47  Given that making and 
distributing a constitutionally-protected product would 
presumably not be a public nuisance, one might assume the right 
to keep and bear arms to be pertinent in this case.  Instead, the 
opinion suggests that the scope of the right is virtually 
meaningless and concludes that ìwhatever view is taken of the 
Second Amendment is immaterial in this case. . . . There is no 
justification in the federal Constitution for private persons failing 
to exercise reasonable care in meeting their legal responsibility 
to help ensure a safe society.î48 
 
Id. 
 45 NAACP v. AcuSport Corp., 210 F.R.D. 268, app. B at 430-32 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(approving report and reserving discretion for court to modify stipulation on disclosure 
between plaintiff and BATF).  After the court dismissed the action, plaintiff moved the 
court to allow the experts to disclose further information for use in academic publications 
and in other lawsuits.  Memorandum in Support of Application for Modification of the 
Protective Order for the BATF Firearm Trace Database at 1, NAACP v. AcuSport Corp., 
210 F.R.D. 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 99 Civ 3999, 99 Civ 7037).  Judge Weinstein denied 
the motion, commenting that ìno public interest overrides the governmentís interestî and 
that ìthis case is dead.î  Proceedings in open court, Oct. 27, 2003 (authorís notes). 
 46 See Depít of Justice, BATFE v. City of Chicago, 123 S.Ct. 1352 (2003) (mem.), 
vacating & remanding 287 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2002).  The Supreme Court remanded the 
case to consider the effect of an appropriations rider prohibiting ATF from disclosing 
firearms trace records except as previously disclosed.  See Consolidated Appropriations 
Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, div. J, tit. 6, ß 644, 117 Stat. 11, 473-74 (2003).  
Congress considered that disclosure of the law enforcement databases in question ìwould 
not only pose a risk to law enforcement and homeland security, but also to the privacy of 
innocent citizens.î  H.R. REP. NO. 107-575, at 20 (2002). 
  Before passage of the rider by Congress, the Solicitor General pointed to various 
provisions of the Gun Control Act which deny records to BATF itself or limit disclosure of 
records by law enforcement.  Brief for the Petitioner at 24-25, Depít of Justice, BATFE v. 
City of Chicago, 123 S.Ct. 1352 (2003) (No. 02-322) (ì[18 U.S.C.] Section 923(g)(3)(B)ís 
strict prohibition on retention and release of multiple sales information by state and local 
authorities would be wholly pointless if any member of the public could obtain the same 
data from ATF pursuant to the FOIA [Freedom of Information Act].î).  The Solicitor 
General also stated that ìthe GCA specifically precludes ATF from imposing any system 
for the registration of firearms, firearms owners, or firearms transactions or dispositions.î  
Id. at 26 (citing 18 U.S.C. ß 926(a)).  See also 18 U.S.C. ß 923(g)(1)(D) (1996) (providing 
that ATF may release licensee records only to a federal, state, or local law enforcement 
agency and only in regard to ìpersons prohibited from purchasing or receiving firearmsî). 
 47 271 F. Supp. 2d at 462-63. 
 48 Id. at 462. 
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Regardless of the meaning of the Second Amendment,49 the 
state arms guarantees protect individual rights to obtain and 
possess firearms.  It seems curious that such guarantees have 
been given such short shrift by some courts.  Two decades ago, 
the guarantee of the right of private citizens to bear arms under 
the Illinois Constitution was cited in part as precluding an action 
against handgun manufacturers for ultra-hazardous activity 
giving rise to strict liability.50  However, that same constitutional 
right did not merit mention in the recent decision of the Illinois 
Court of Appeals upholding Chicagoís public nuisance suit 
against the industry.51 
Another case in point is the decision of the Indiana Supreme 
Court in City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp.52  The Indiana 
Bill of Rights provides that ì[t]he people shall have a right to 
bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State.î53  In 
prior precedent which upheld a civil rights claim against the City 
of Gary for refusing to provide and process handgun carry 
permits, the Indiana Supreme Court stated: 
[This] right of Indiana citizens to bear arms for their own self-
defense and for the defense of the state is an interest in both 
liberty and property which is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. . . . This interest is 
one of liberty to the extent that it enables law-abiding citizens 
to be free from the threat and danger of violent crime.  There is 
also a property interest at stake, for example, in protecting 
oneís valuables when transporting them, as in the case of a 
businessman who brings a sum of cash to deposit in his bank 
across town.54 
In Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., the Indiana Court of 
Appeals relied on the above in part in refusing to recognize a 
public nuisance claim for manufacture and distribution of 
 
 49 See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 50 As the Seventh Circuit explained: 
We are also concerned that plaintiffsí argument would thwart Illinoisí policy 
regarding possession of handguns.  The right of private citizens in Illinois to 
bear arms is protected, at least against all restrictions except those imposed by 
the police power, by the Illinois Constitution. . . . The State of Illinois 
regulates, but does not ban, the possession of handguns by private citizens. . . . 
Imposing liability for the sale of handguns, which would in practice drive 
manufacturers out of business, would produce a handgun ban by judicial fiat in 
the face of the decision by Illinois to allow its citizens to possess handguns. 
Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 51 City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), appeal 
granted, 788 N.E.2d 727 (Ill. 2003).  Oral argument before the Illinois Supreme Court has 
taken place and a decision on the appeal is pending.  Christi Parsons, Justices Take Up 
Firearms Control, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 2003, Metro, at 1. 
 52 776 N.E.2d 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), revíd, 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003). 
 53 IND. CONST. art. I, ß 32. 
 54 Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 694 (Ind. 1990). 
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handguns.55  The court noted that the U.S. Congress and the 
Indiana General Assembly pervasively regulated the 
manufacture, distribution, sale, and use of handguns and, thus, 
had evaluated the benefits and evils thereof.  These legislative 
bodies represented the people in the democratic process and 
ìstruck the appropriate balance between the societal costs of 
handguns and the historical right to bear arms.î56 
The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed.  It held that the 
complaint stated a claim against the firearms industry based on 
allegedly wrongful sales practices, negligent designs, and 
deceptive advertising.57  The court actually agreed with the 
manufacturers that ìin every one of over 1,000 Indiana state 
court and 50 federal public nuisance decisions,î public nuisance 
claims were recognized only where a statute was violated or the 
nuisance resulted from use of real property.58  Nonetheless, the 
court concluded that a municipality has a viable claim for public 
nuisance based on ìan unreasonable interference with a public 
right,î even where the activity is lawful and does not involve 
land.59 
The Gary court cited the provisions of law dealing with the 
sale of handguns and also fleetingly referred to Indianaís 
constitutional guarantee that the citizens have a right to bear 
arms.60  Without any discussion of how exercise of a 
constitutional right could give rise to liability, the court 
concluded that lawful activity could be conducted unreasonably 
and give rise to nuisance.61 
The court made no attempt to reconcile upholding the 
deceptive advertising component of the public nuisance claim and 
the constitutional right to bear arms (the most absolute element 
of which is the right to keep arms in the home).62  The court 
stated about that claim: 
The City also asserts claims of misleading and deceptive 
advertising and marketing of guns. . . .  Specifically, the City 
alleges that guns are presented as adding to a homeownerís 
safety when in fact the opposite is true. . . . For the same 
reasons applicable to the allegation of contributing to unlawful 
 
 55 776 N.E.2d at 387. 
 56 Id. 
 57 City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson, Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1227, 1247 (Ind. 2003). 
 58 Id. at 1231 (internal quotations omitted). 
 59 Id. at 1233. 
 60 Id. at 1234 (citing IND. CONST. art. I, ß 32 (right to bear arms) and IND. CODE ßß 
35-47-2.5-1 to -15 (1998) (sale of handguns)). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See, e.g., State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 805 (Wis. 2003) (discussing the 
unreasonableness of regulating ìsensible conductî on oneís private property). 
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sales practices, we agree that these claims, if proven, state a 
claim for injunctive relief based on an action for public 
nuisance and negligence theories.63 
Indianaís constitutional right to bear arms should have 
resolved the fact that guns may add to a homeownerís safety.  
The courtís holding questions the very legitimacy of this 
provision and implies that the right to bear arms for defense is a 
false value.  Are we to accuse the framers and ratifiers of the 
Indiana Constitution of deceptive advertising?  In reality, the 
question of homeowner safety and gun ownership is one that is 
best left to the political process.  It should be beyond the purview 
of the courts to decide that the people of Indiana are incorrect in 
the factual assumptions that underlie the constitutional right 
they created.64 
Despite the Gary courtís holding that a claim was stated in 
the pleadings, whether the plaintiffs can prove their allegations 
is another matter.  The court itself agreed that ìlegislative policy 
permitting lawful distribution of guns is relevant here.î65  
Moreover, the court further recognized: ìThe conclusory 
allegations of the complaint leave much unanswered.  For the 
reasons cited, there may be substantial barriers to recovery of 
any or all of these damages.î66  In other words, the plaintiffsí 
sweeping allegations that the members of the firearms industry 
are somehow conniving conspirators intent on supplying 
criminals with guns may be unprovable and false. 
 
 
 63 801 N.E.2d at 1247. 
 64 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (invalidating 
Brady Act amendment to Gun Control Act and noting of comparison of constitutional 
systems different from that of the United States, ìsuch comparative analysis [is] 
inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite 
relevant to the task of writing oneî); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for 
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) (stating that some 
constitutional rights are not ìin some way less ëfundamentalí than [others].  Each 
establishes a norm of conduct which the Federal Government is bound to honoróto no 
greater or lesser extent than any other inscribed in the Constitution.î); Ullmann v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1956) (ìAs no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so 
none should suffer subordination or deletion. . . . To view a particular provision of the Bill 
of Rights with disfavor inevitably results in a constricted application of it.î); Arnold v. 
City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (Ohio 1993) (ìWe are cognizant of the current 
controversy that exists in Ohio and across our nation over the right of an individual to 
possess firearms. . . . [I]t is our charge to determine and not to disturb the clear 
protections provided by the drafters of our Constitution.î); State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 
95 (Or. 1980) (ìWe are not unmindful that there is current controversy over the wisdom of 
a right to bear arms . . . .  Our task, however, in construing a constitutional provision is to 
respect the principles given the status of constitutional guarantees and limitations by the 
drafters; it is not to abandon these principles when this fits the needs of the moment.î). 
 65 801 N.E.2d at 1244. 
 66 Id. 
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III. ìNEGLIGENT MARKETINGî TO POLICE IN STATES WITH ìLESS 
STRICTî GUN CONTROL: THE NINTH CIRCUITíS ILETO V. GLOCK 
INC. DECISION 
In 1999, Buford Furrow shot and wounded five persons at a 
local Jewish Community Center in California and then shot and 
killed Joseph Ileto, a postal worker, at a nearby locality.67  He 
used a Glock pistol that had originally been sold to a police 
department in the State of Washington and was later unlawfully 
purchased by Furrow, who was ineligible to possess firearms.68  
While aware that Furrow may have been in unlawful possession, 
police failed to follow up.  As a law enforcement officer noted 
after the tragedy, ìWe planned to [search Furrowís home]; we 
just hadnít gotten around to it yet.î69  The inevitable lawsuit was 
filed against several firearm manufacturers and distributors, and 
in Ileto, the Ninth Circuitóin a 2-1 opinion by Circuit Judge 
Richard Paezóheld that the defendants who made or sold the 
firearms used by Furrow could be subject to liability under 
California tort law for negligence and public nuisance.70 
The court held that sufficient factual issues over whether the 
industry owed a duty of care and breached that duty were raised 
by plaintiffsí allegations that ìthe defendants created an illegal 
secondary firearms market that was intentionally directed at 
supplying guns to prohibited gun purchasers like Furrow.î71  
This is the mantra of the current onslaught of lawsuits against 
the firearms industry, which would be shocking if supported but 
seems more fantasy than reality.  This is made clear in the more 
particularized allegations of the complaint, which the court 
summarizes as follows: 
Plaintiffs allege that Glockís marketing and distribution 
strategy includes the purposeful oversupply of guns to police 
departments and the provision of unnecessary upgrades and 
free exchange of guns with police departments to create a 
supply of post-police guns that can be sold through unlicensed 
dealers without background checks to illegal buyers at a profit.  
Glock allegedly targets states like Washington, where the gun 
laws are less strict than in California, in order to increase sales 
to all buyers, including illegal purchasers, who will take their 
guns into neighboring California.  The ATF has provided Glock 
with the names of the distributors who are responsible for the 
sales of guns that end up in the hands of criminals, but Glock 
 
 67 Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 68 Id. at 1197. 
 69 Evening News with Dan Rather: Furrow Faces Death Penalty; Tragedy Revives 
Gun Debate (CBS News television broadcast, Aug. 12, 1999). 
 70 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1217 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 71 Id. at 1204. 
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has ignored the information and continues to supply these 
same distributors.72 
Upholding the claims under such allegations raises serious 
questions regarding the fundamental system of American 
federalism, under which the states are free to experiment with 
their own versions of republicanism.  In the words of Justice 
Brandeis: ìIt is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.î73 
First, contrary to Ileto, it is not Glock but the State of 
Washington that enacts ìgun laws [that] are less strict than in 
California.î74  Indeed, almost all states in the United States have 
gun laws that are less strict than California.75  While Californiaís 
Constitution has no arms guarantee, the Washington Bill of 
Rights provides: ìThe right of the individual citizen to bear arms 
in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired.î76  The 
Washington courts have held that this provision must be strictly 
followed.77  Under plaintiffsí theory, would not the State of 
Washington be ultimately responsible because it has ìless strictî 
gun laws? 
Second, it is difficult to blame Glock for the policies of 
Washington police departments which result in, as alleged by 
Ileto, ìthe purposeful oversupply of guns to police departments 
and the provision of unnecessary upgrades and free exchange of 
guns with police departments.î78  The premise of the complaint is 
that police departments buy, upgrade, exchange, and sell too 
many guns.  Again, under plaintiffsí theory, would not the 
Washington police departments be responsible because of their 
own purchase and exchange policies? 
In the final analysis, the question is raised of whether 
California policymakers are entitled to play schoolmarm to the 
policymakers of Washington and almost all other states.  It 
would make as much sense to allow victims of crime in 
 
 72 Id. at 1204-05. 
 73 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 74 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1204-05. 
 75 See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK, app. A (West 2003) 
(summarizing state firearms laws). 
 76 WASH. CONST. art. I, ß 24. 
 77 E.g., State v. Spiers, 79 P.3d 30, 31 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a statute 
ìunconstitutionally infringes on the right to bear arms by criminalizing firearm 
ownership for persons merely charged with a ëserious offense,í regardless of whether they 
have relinquished possessionî). 
 78 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1204. 
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Washington to blame California and its police departments for 
disarming law-abiding citizens and allowing armed criminals to 
run amok, thereby allowing such criminals to spill over the 
borders and commit crimes in Washington.79 
Third, Ileto claims that ì[t]he ATF has provided Glock with 
the names of the distributors who are responsible for the sales of 
guns that end up in the hands of criminals, but Glock has 
ignored the information.î80  This allegation is based on the 
unwarranted insinuation that, because ATF has requested that 
Glock trace certain firearms, the distributors to which Glock 
transferred such firearms are criminals or knowingly sell guns to 
criminals.  Yet firearm traces mean little.  Neither Washington 
law nor federal law provides that a manufacturer may not sell 
firearms to a distributor or dealer which has been the subject of 
BATF trace requests. 
It is simply false to suggest that traced firearms necessarily 
have ìend[ed] up in the hands of criminals.î81  Nothing in the law 
provides for revocation of firearms licenses based merely on the 
number of traces.  The federal Gun Control Act mandates license 
revocation upon the willful violation of the law or regulations82 
and provides authority to trace firearms,83 but nowhere implies 
that traces are evidence of criminality of federally licensed 
firearms manufacturers, importers, or dealers.  Revocation of a 
license based on the number of traces would violate the Gun 
Control Act and basic due process. 
Any number of reasons exist to explain why one dealer would 
have more traces than another.  The first would be sales 
volumeóa large dealer which sells thousands of guns per year, 
for instance, would obviously have more traces than a small 
retailer.  An urban dealer could have more traces because it does 
business in a high crime area.  The higher crime rate in such 
areas does not necessarily indicate wrongdoing by the dealers or 
their customers.84  For instance, persons who lawfully purchase 
 
 79 Indeed, in a hypothetical suit plaintiffs could turn the Ileto claims upside down 
and allege that as a result of the adoption of the Ileto rule, the marketing and distribution 
policies of firearm manufacturers have resulted in the undersupply of guns to Washington 
police departments and law-abiding citizens, and it was foreseeable that plaintiff X would 
be unable to obtain a firearm and protect herself from the crime described herein. 
 80 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1205. 
 81 Id. at 1205. 
 82 18 U.S.C. ß 923(e) (2002). 
 83 Id. ß 923(g)(7). 
 84 For instance, a federal court rejected a lawsuit against inexpensive handgun 
makers for criminal acts based in part on the following: 
[W]hile blighted areas may be some of the breeding places of crime, not all 
residents of [such areas] are so engaged, and indeed, most persons who live 
there are lawabiding but have no other choice of location.  But they, like their 
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firearms from licensed dealers may themselves be crime victims 
by reason of having their firearms stolen.  Stolen firearms which 
are recovered will be traced and, in many instances, returned to 
their owners. 
Some dealers will always have a greater number or a higher 
proportion of firearm traces than others.  Statistically, all dealers 
will never have an identical percentage of firearms traced.  If the 
dealers with an ìabove averageî number of traces were 
eliminated, then the remaining set of dealers would also have an 
ìabove averageî subset.  The further elimination of ìabove 
averageî dealers would ultimately leave just one dealer in the 
universe.  Yet, it is rather unremarkable that some dealers have 
more traces than others.  A world in which all dealers have a 
ìbelow averageî number of traces is no more possible than one in 
which ìall of the children are above average.î85 
The Ileto court upheld a cause of action for breach of duty 
based on the following more embellished allegations of the 
complaint: 
First, plaintiffs alleged that the ATF provided manufacturers 
detailed reports of the distributors, dealers, and gun shows 
that consistently supply the guns used in crimes.  Plaintiffs 
further alleged that the defendant manufacturers and 
distributors failed to utilize distribution techniques that were 
commonly used by other businesses to avoid distribution to 
illegal end users.  Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that 
Glock and other defendant manufacturers negotiate contracts 
with distributors . . . and dealers that do not include basic 
provisions to address the risk of acquisition of firearms by 
prohibited purchasers despite the fact that other forms of 
incentive provisions regularly were included in the contracts.  
According to plaintiffs, the defendants also fail to utilize basic 
training instruction that would help dealers and distributors 
recognize straw buyers or avoid distribution to illegal 
purchasers.86 
As explained previously, ATFís requests for trace 
information constitute no reliable index for ìguns used in crime.î  
 
counterparts in other areas of the city, may seek to protect themselves, their 
families and their property against crime, and indeed, may feel an even greater 
need to do so since the crime rate in their community may be higher than in 
other areas of the city. . . . To remove cheap weapons from the community may 
very well remove a form of protection assuming that all citizens are entitled to 
possess guns for defense. 
Delahanty v. Hinckley, 686 F. Supp. 920, 929 (D.D.C. 1986). 
 85 Note the registered trademark of Garrison Keillor: ìWhere the women are strong, 
the men are good looking, and all of the children are above average.î  
http://www.prairiehome.org/content/trademarks.shtml (last visited Jan. 27, 2004). 
 86 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1205. 
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A study by the Congressional Research Service explains: 
[A] law enforcement officer may initiate a trace request for any 
reason.  No crime need be involved.  No screening policy 
ensures or requires that only guns known or suspected to have 
been used in crimes are traced. . . . [T]he extent to which trace 
requests focus on guns not involved in crimes cannot be 
determined . . . .87 
As to the industryís failure to prevent ineligible persons from 
ever obtaining firearms, all licensed firearm dealers are subject 
to the federal Brady Act requirement that a criminal background 
check must be conducted on transferees.88  They are held 
criminally responsible for transferring a firearm to any person 
they know or have reasonable cause to believe is ineligible to 
receive a firearm.89  They must also follow whatever 
requirements state law mandates.  The plaintiffs allege 
essentially that federal and state law requirements are 
insufficient and that somehow the members of the industry must 
achieve a more perfect world in which no criminal ever obtains a 
firearm. 
Federal and state legislators have not figured out the 
panacea for crime, yet the Ileto court insists that ìthe defendants 
have the knowledge and the means to distribute guns in a 
manner that would reduce the risk of access and use by 
prohibited persons.î90  The court applies the same reasoning in 
upholding the public nuisance claim.  It seems, in the courtís 
opinion, that the defendants ìmarket, distribute, promote, and 
sell their products with reckless disregard for human life and for 
the peace, tranquility, and economic well being of the public.î91  
The court adds: 
[T]he fact that the manufacture and sale of guns is legal does 
not prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their nuisance claim.  
 
 87 Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress; ìAssault Weaponsî: Military 
Style Semiautomatic Firearms Facts and Issues, 1992, app. B, at 66.  The report explained 
further: 
For example, a trace may be conducted on a firearm found at the residence of a 
suspect though the firearm itself is not associated with a criminal act.  Traces 
may also be requested with respect to abandoned firearms, those found by 
chance, those seen by officers for sale at guns shows or pawn shops, or those 
used by suicide victims.  In addition, traces may be requested with respect to 
firearms seized pursuant to an investigation not directly related with a violent 
criminal offense, such as tax evasion or a technical violation of the Gun Control 
Act provisions.  It is not possible to identify how frequently firearms traces are 
requested for reasons other than those associated with violent crimes. 
Id. at 70. 
 88 18 U.S.C. ß 922(t)(1) (1996 & Supp. 2003). 
 89 Id. at ß 922(d). 
 90 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1206. 
 91 Id. at 1210. 
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Here, the alleged nuisance is not premised on the legal 
manufacture and design of the guns or the sale of guns to 
individuals who are legally entitled to purchase them.  On the 
contrary, the nuisance claim rests on the defendantsí actions in 
creating an illegal secondary market for guns by purposefully 
over-saturating the legal gun market in order to take 
advantage of re-sales to distributors that they know or should 
know will in turn sell to illegal buyers.92 
In short, an industry which abides by all federal and state 
requirements should nonetheless know that it sells too many 
products and must not ìover-saturateî the market.  One can 
imagine the application of this theory to the beer industry.  
Brewers over-saturate the market knowing full well that some 
customers under the age of twenty-one will buy beer.  
Unscrupulous groceries and convenience markets merely card 
buyers without developing sure-fire techniques of weeding out 
straw purchasers (those persons over twenty-one purchasing for 
those under twenty-one).  Manufacturers are well aware of high-
violation zones, such as college towns, yet still ship beer to 
dealers at such places.  Thus, the brewers must be responsible for 
all alcohol related injuries and deaths. 
In a dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall 
wrote that the action was in reality a products liability action 
and, therefore, was barred by a California statute that provided, 
ì[i]njuries or damages resulting from the discharge of a firearm 
or ammunition are not proximately caused by its potential to 
cause serious injury, damage, or death, but are proximately 
caused by the actual discharge of the product.î93  In Merrill v. 
Navegar, Inc.,94 the California Supreme Court rejected a similar 
attempt to redefine a product liability action into a negligent 
marketing action, which would have avoided that statute.95  
Judge Hall wrote: 
In Merrill, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant gun 
manufacturer was negligent in that it marketed its guns to the 
general public while knowing that the guns would find their 
 
 92 Id. at 1214. 
 93 Id. at 1218-19 (internal quotations omitted) (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. 
CIV. CODE ß 1714.4(b)(2) (Deering 2002)). 
 94 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001). 
 95 Id. at 130.  The Merrill court wrote: 
[V]irtually every person suing for injuries from firearm use could offer evidence 
the manufacturer knew or should have known the risk of making its firearm 
available to the public outweighed the benefits of that conduct, and could 
therefore raise a triable issue of fact for the jury.  In each of these cases, the 
jury would be asked to do precisely what section 1714.4 prohibits: weigh the 
risks and benefits of a particular firearm.  The result would be to resurrect the 
very type of lawsuit the Legislature passed section 1714.4 to foreclose . . . . 
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way to criminals.  Here, appellants allege that the appellee gun 
manufacturers were negligent by marketing their guns to law 
enforcement while knowing that the guns will find their way to 
criminals.  But appellantsí allegation that the gun 
manufacturers purposefully ìover-marketedî their product to 
law enforcement, which made the guns reach illegal markets 
faster, is not legally cognizable. . . . In general, a manufacturer 
of a legal product has no duty to refrain from attempting to sell 
as many products as possible.96 
Judge Hall also would have rejected the public nuisance 
claim because such cases invariably related to the use of real 
property not products.97  She concluded: ìThe debate over the 
extent to which gun manufacturers should be held liable to 
victims of gun violence belongs in the democratic process.  The 
public debate benefits from able advocates on all sidesówe need 
not enter it.î98 
On remand, should Ileto proceed through discovery and 
summary judgment, plaintiffs will have to offer evidence that 
firearm manufacturers and police departments are in cahoots to 
distribute firearms to a vast criminal network.  And, should the 
case go to trial, they will have to convince a jury that by selling 
guns to police the industry thereby arms the underworld.  Ileto 
well illustrates the extent to which the suits against the firearms 
industry keep getting, in the words of Alice in Wonderland, 
ìcuriouser and curiouser.î99 
IV. THE PROTECTION OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN ARMS ACT 
The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, designated 
as H.R. 1036 and sponsored by Rep. Cliff Stearns (R-Fla.), passed 
the House of Representatives on April 9, 2003, with a 285 - 140 
vote.100  It is described as ì[a] bill to prohibit civil liability actions 
from being brought or continued against manufacturers, 
distributors, dealers, or importers of firearms or ammunition for 
damages resulting from the misuse of their products by 
others.î101 
The original Senate bill, S. 659, introduced by Senators 
Larry Craig (R-Idaho) and Max Baucus (D-Mont.), contained 
 
Id. 
 96 Ileto, 349 F.3d at 1222 n.3 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
 97 Id. at 1224 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
 98 Id. (Hall, J., dissenting). 
 99 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 11 (1974). 
 100 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003).  See 
also 149 CONG. REC. H2996-99 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2003). 
 101 149 CONG REC. H2,863 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 2003). 
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identical language as H.R. 1036.102  Senator Thomas Daschle (D.-
S.D.), the Minority Leader, announced his support for the bill 
subject to clarifying amendments.103  That led to the introduction 
of S. 1805, the Daschle-Craig-Baucus version of S. 659.104  A 
threatened filibuster did not materialize, as S. 1805 was debated 
February 25-March 2, 2004.105  President Bush, who has stated 
that he will sign the bill if it passes, urged the Senate to enact ìa 
clean billî without amendments which would interfere with its 
ultimate passage.106 
However, the Senate voted to add to the bill controversial 
provisions renewing the federal ìassault weaponsî prohibition, 
which was scheduled to expire,107 and requiring background 
checks at gun shows for transactions between unlicensed 
persons.108  This led the proponents of S. 1805 to join its 
opponents in voting against final passage of the amended bill, 
which went down in flames by a vote of 8 to 90.109 
 
 
 102 S. 659, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 103 Press Release, Tom Daschle, U.S. Senator, Daschle Announces Support for 
Legislation Limiting Liability for Gun Manufacturers (Sept. 25, 2003), 
http://daschle.senate.gov/~daschle/pressroom/releases/03/09/2003926416.html. 
 104 Senator Craig introduced S. 1805, which incorporates the Daschle amendments, 
and S. Res. 1806, which is an unamended version of S. 659.  See 149 CONG. REC. S13,711 
(daily ed. Oct. 31, 2003). 
 105 150 CONG. REC. S1897-98 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2004). 
 106 Press Release, Institute for Legislative Action, National Rifle Association, Unions, 
Commerce and Conservation Organizations Urge Passage of S. 659, The ìProtection Of 
Lawful Commerce In Arms Actî (Sep. 9, 2003), http://www.nraila.org/news/read/releases
.aspx?ID=3029.  A policy statement by the Bush Administration states: 
The Administration strongly supports Senate passage of S. 1805.  The 
Administration urges the Senate to pass a clean bill, in order to ensure 
enactment of the legislation this year.  Any amendment that would delay 
enactment of the bill beyond this year is unacceptable.  The manufacturer or 
seller of a legal, non-defective product should not be held liable for the criminal 
or unlawful misuse of that product by others.  The possibility of imposing 
liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely caused by others is an 
abuse of the legal system, erodes public confidence in our Nationís laws, 
threatens the diminution of a basic constitutional right and civil liberty, sets a 
poor precedent for other lawful industries, will cause a loss of jobs, and 
burdens interstate and foreign commerce.  S. 1805 would help curb frivolous 
litigation against a lawful American industry and the thousands of workers it 
employs and would help prevent abuse of the legal system.  At the same time, 
the legislation would carefully preserve the right of individuals to have their 
day in court with civil liability actions.  These civil actions are enumerated in 
the bill and respect the traditional role of the States in our Federal system 
with regard to such actions. 
Statement of Administration Policy, Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget, S. 1805 - Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (Feb. 24, 
2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/108-2/s1805sap-s.pdf. 
 107 See 150 CONG. REC. S1971 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2004). 
 108 Id. at S2,006-08. 
 109 Id. at S1,976. 
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The following analyzes H.R. 1036 and S. 1805 (referred to 
below as the Daschle version).  While enactment of the substance 
of these bills is uncertain, the support thereof by majorities in 
both the House and Senate suggests that some version of the 
bills may be enacted at a future time. 
H.R. 1036 begins with significant Findings and Purposes, 
none of which would be changed by the Daschle version.110  The 
first Finding declares: ìCitizens have a right, protected by the 
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, to keep 
and bear arms.î111  While that claim is being hotly debated in the 
courts,112 Congress has passed similar declarations on three 
previous occasions,113 and much of the scholarship supports the 
individual rights interpretation.114  The Finding has significance 
for two purposes.  First, given that having arms is a 
constitutional right, it hardly makes sense to allow lawsuits 
against manufacturers for making constitutionally-protected 
products.115  Second, this right would provide federal jurisdiction 
to preempt state law that may authorize lawsuits against the 
industry merely for supplying this constitutionally-protected 
product to ìthe peopleî whom the Second Amendment protects.116 
 
 110 Compare H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003), with S. 1805, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 111 H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. ß 2(a)(1) (2003). 
 112 Compare United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 232 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right), with Silveira v. Lockyer, 
312 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Second Amendment guarantees only 
State militia power), rehíg denied, 328 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying a rehearing en 
banc over dissenting opinions by Judges Pregerson, Kozinski, Kleinfeld, and Gould), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 803 (2003). 
 113 Freedmenís Bureau Act, ch. 200, ß 14, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77 (1866) (ì[T]he right . . . 
to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, 
personal security, . . . including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to 
and enjoyed by all the citizens . . . .î); Property Requisition Act, Pub. L. No. 274, 55 Stat. 
742, 742 (1941) (prohibiting construction of law to allow requisition or registration of  
ìfirearms possessed by any individual for his personal protection or sportî or ìto impair or 
infringe in any manner the right of any individual to keep and bear armsî); Firearms 
Ownersí Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, ß1(b)(1)(A), 100 Stat. 449, 449 (1986) 
(declaring ìthe rights of citizens . . . to keep and bear arms under the second amendment 
to the United States Constitutionî). 
 114 But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.2 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (citing scholarship supporting both sides of the issue). 
 115 See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, Tort Liability for the Manufacture, Sale, and 
Ownership of Handguns?, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 351, 364-72 (1983).  That the existence of a 
constitutional right limits state tort law is illustrated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (addressing ìthe extent to which the constitutional protections 
for speech and press limit a Stateís power to award damages in a libel action brought by a 
public official against critics of his official conduct.î). 
 116 This presupposes that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second 
Amendment (as it does most of the rest of the Bill of Rights) and that Congress is using 
its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent State infringement 
on the right.  See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND 
THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (1998).  But, Congress could do this under its militia 
power as well.  U.S. CONST. art. I, ß 8, cls. 15 & 16.  As the Supreme Court long ago noted: 
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Lawsuits have been commenced, the Findings continue, 
against the firearms industry for damages and other relief for the 
harm caused by criminals and other third parties who misuse 
firearms.117  However, ì[t]he manufacture, importation, 
possession, sale, and use of firearms and ammunition in the 
United States are heavily regulated by Federal, State, and local 
laws.î118  Indeed, the federal Gun Control Act was originally 
passed under the Commerce Clause,119 which is another 
jurisdictional hook for the proposed bill.  As the Findings recite, 
businesses ìare engaged in interstate and foreign commerce 
through the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, 
importation, or sale to the public of firearms or ammunition that 
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce,î and they should not be liable for the harm caused by 
unlawful misuse of firearms that function as designed and 
intended.120 
Such imposition of liability on an industry abuses the legal 
system, erodes public confidence in the law, ìthreatens the 
diminution of a basic constitutional right and civil liberty,î121 
destabilizes other industries in the free enterprise system of the 
United States, andóagain, the clincher for federal jurisdictionó
îconstitutes an unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign 
commerce of the United States.î122 
 
 
All citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force or 
reserve militia of the United States as well as of the states, and, in view of this 
prerogative of the general government . . . the states cannot, even laying the 
constitutional provision in question [the Second Amendment] out of view, 
prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United 
States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and 
disable the people from performing their duty to the general government. 
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). 
 117 H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. ß 2(a)(2) (2003). 
 118 Id. ß 2(a)(3). 
 119 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).  As is clear on its face, the 
Arms Export Control Act was passed under Congressí authority to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations.  The National Firearms Act, by contrast, was passed under the tax 
power and is part of the Internal Revenue Code.  See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 
506, 511 (1937). 
 120 H.R. 1036, ß 2(a)(4). 
 121 Statement of Administration Policy, supra note 106. 
 122 H.R. 1036, ß 2(a)(5).  Justification of the bill under the Commerce Clause seems to 
be clear given the Supreme Courtís upholding of most legislation (including Gun Control 
Act provisions) even purporting to be passed under that clause, particularly laws that 
include findings that an activity affects interstate and foreign commerce and that include 
elements requiring such commercial nexus.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 1630.  Indeed, this bill 
seeks to override attempts by single states to suppress commerce with foreign countries 
and among other states.  See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003) (imposing 
liability on Austrian manufacturer and Georgia importer for sales to law enforcement in 
Washington). 
HALBROOK FINAL MAY 28 5/28/2004 4:19 PM 
33 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 7:11 
Such liability actions, which have been commenced or 
contemplated by the United States, various States, 
municipalities, and private interest groups, are unprecedented 
and are not ìa bona fide expansion of the common law.î123  The 
sustaining of these actions by a ìmaverickî judge or jury would 
expand liability in a manner never contemplated by the 
Constitutionís Framers or by the federal or state legislatures.124  
And now for yet another jurisdictional hook: ìSuch an expansion 
of liability would constitute a deprivation of the rights, privileges, 
and immunities guaranteed to a citizen of the United States 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.î125  Those rights would presumably include the 
right to keep and bear arms and the right to due process of law. 
The above constitutional aspects are further clarified in the 
Purposes clause to the bill.  The immediate purpose, of course, is 
to prohibit causes of action against the firearms industry for 
harm caused by criminals and others who unlawfully misuse 
firearms.126  The values of the Second Amendment are reflected 
further in the Purposes: ì[t]o preserve a citizenís access to a 
supply of firearms and ammunition for all lawful purposes, 
including hunting, self-defense, collecting, and competitive or 
recreational shooting,î and ì[t]o guarantee a citizenís rights, 
privileges, and immunities, as applied to the States, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
pursuant to section 5 of that Amendment.î127  Section 5 is, of 
course, the Enforcement Clause. 
After repeating the purpose of preventing such lawsuits from 
imposing ìunreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign 
commerce,î128 a new purpose is interjectedóthat of protecting 
the First Amendment rights of members of the firearms industry, 
including their trade associations, ìto speak freely, to assemble 
peaceably, and to petition the Government for a redress of their 
grievances.î129  These rights were undoubtedly included because 
some of the suits alleged a conspiracy to defraud the public into 
believing that firearms are useful for self-defense, that 
associating and speaking together amounted to a plot to 
oversupply police and the public with firearms so that the 
criminal element could get them, and that petitioning Congress 
against passage of various firearms prohibitions helped criminals 
 
 123 H.R. 1036, ß 2(a)(6). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. ß 2(b)(1). 
 127 Id. ß 2(b)(2), (3). 
 128 Id. ß 2(b)(4). 
 129 Id. ß 2(b)(5). 
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to obtain firearms.130 
The meat of the bill is contained in a single sentence: ìA 
qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal 
or State court.î  Further, any such pending action ìshall be 
dismissed immediately.î131  The remainder of the bill contains 
various definitions which clarify the nature of the prohibited civil 
actions in contrast with the types of traditional actions that are 
unaffected. 
The term ìqualified productî means a firearm, antique 
firearm, ammunition, or a component part thereof ìthat has been 
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.î132  The 
term ìqualified civil liability actionî is defined as ìa civil action 
brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a 
qualified product, or a trade association, for damages or 
injunctive relief resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse 
of a qualified product by the person or a third party.î133  In short, 
no action at law or in equity may be filed against a gun maker or 
seller where a criminal or other person unlawfully misused a 
firearm.  (The Daschle version would add the definition of 
ìunlawful misuseî as ìconduct that violates a statute, ordinance 
or regulation as it relates to the use of a qualified product.î134  
That would nip in the bud an action alleging an unlawful ìuseî 
rather than ìmisuse.î) 
The term ìpersonî includes an individual, corporation, other 
specified groups, ìor any other entity, including any 
governmental entity.î135  Thus, persons who could not file suit 
include private as well as governmental entities, such as 
municipalities, state attorneys general, and federal agenciesóall 
of which have brought such suits in the past.  Entities shielded 
from such lawsuits are federal firearms licensees, including a 
 
 130 Among the defendants named in City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 
199902590, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352, at *1 (July 13, 2000), were the American 
Shooting Sports Council, Inc., National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., and the 
Sporting Arms & Ammunition Manufacturers Institute, Inc. 
 131 H.R. 1036, ß 3. 
 132 Id. ß 4(4).  As the bill specifies, the definition of ìfirearmî is limited to the two 
ìfirearmî definitions in 18 U.S.C. ß 921(a)(3)(A) and (B), which include a weapon which 
expels a projectile by the action of an explosive (or is designed or may be readily converted 
to do so), and the frame or receiver of such weapon.  That excludes the definitions of 
firearm in (C) and (D) respectively as a firearm muffler or silencer, and as a destructive 
device, which includes explosive devices and certain non-sporting firearms with barrels 
over .50 caliber.  The billís definition of ìfirearmî also includes an antique firearm, which 
ß 921(a)(16) defines to include firearms made before 1898 and certain replicas.  The 
definition of ìammunitionî may be found in ß 921(a)(17), and includes both ammunition 
and components. 
 133 H.R. 1036, ß 4(5)(A). 
 134 S. 1805, 108th Cong. ß 4(9) (2003). 
 135 H.R. 1036, ß 4(3). 
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ìmanufacturerî (a person engaged in the business of 
manufacturing a qualified product in interstate or foreign 
commerce)136 and a ìsellerî (which includes a firearm importer or 
dealer or a person engaged in the business of selling 
ammunition).137  The term ìengaged in the businessî refers to a 
person who devotes time, attention, and labor to the activity in 
question as a regular course of trade or business with the 
principal objective of livelihood and profit through the sale or 
distribution of the product.138 
Also exempted is a ìtrade association,î which is any non-
profit association or business, regardless of whether 
incorporated, of which at least two members are manufacturers 
or sellers of a qualified product.139  The Daschle version would 
add the further meaning that the association ìis involved in 
promoting the business interests of its members, including 
organizing, advising, or representing its members with respect to 
their business, legislative or legal activities in relation to the 
manufacture, importation or sale of a qualified product.î140  This 
would further clarify the legitimate nature of such organizations 
and their First Amendment right to freedom of association. 
As noted above, a qualified civil liability action may not be 
brought in any court.  However, five types of causes of action are 
excluded from the definition of ìqualified civil liability action,î 
and may continue to be brought.141  They include the following: 
ì(i) an action brought against a transferor convicted under 
section 924(h) of title 18, United States Code, or a comparable or 
identical State felony law, by a party directly harmed by the 
conduct of which the transferee is so convictedî142  The referenced 
section punishes ì[w]hoever knowingly transfers a firearm, 
knowing that such firearm will be used to commit a crime of 
violence . . . or drug trafficking crime.î143  As noted, the 
transferor must be convicted of this or a comparable state 
offense, and the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime of 
which the transferee is convicted must directly harm the party 
who would bring an action. 
 
 136 Id. ß 4(2). 
 137 Id. ß 4(6) (referring to 18 U.S.C. ß 921(a)(9), which defines ìimporter,î ß 921(a)(11), 
which defines ìdealer,î and ß 921(a)(17), which defines ìammunitionî). 
 138 Id. at ß 4(1) (referring to 18 U.S.C. ß 921(a)(21), which defines ìengaged in the 
businessî). 
 139 Id. at ß 4(8). 
 140 S. 1805, ß 4(8)(C). 
 141 H.R. 1036, ß 4(5)(A). 
 142 Id. ß 4(5)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
 143 18 U.S.C. ß 924(h) (1996) (defining crime of violence as in ß 924(c)(3) (felonies 
involving use or threat of force against person or property) and drug trafficking crime as 
in ß 924(c)(2) (federal drug felonies)). 
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ì(ii) an action brought against a seller for negligent 
entrustment or negligence per seî144  The term ìnegligent 
entrustmentî means: 
the supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by 
another person when the seller knows or should know the 
person to whom the product is supplied is likely to use the 
product, and in fact does use the product, in a manner 
involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person 
and others.145 
(The Daschle version would say ìor othersî.)146  That might 
mean supplying a firearm to an irresponsible youth or to a 
person known to be mentally ill.  An action involving ìnegligence 
per seî might include, for instance, the sale of a firearm to a 
known violent felon. 
ì(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a 
qualified product knowingly and willfully violated a State or 
Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, 
and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which 
relief is soughtî147  The Daschle version would strike ìknowingly 
and willfully,î reflecting the fact that the federal Gun Control Act 
requires proof that specific offenses be proven as either knowing 
or willful.148  However, some state firearm statutes have been 
interpreted to impose a ìknew or reasonably should have knownî 
standard akin to civil cases,149 or even to impose strict liability.150  
In such states, depending on how broadly a court interpreted 
proximate cause, this portion of the Daschle amendment may not 
 
 144 H.R. 1036, ß 4(5)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 145 Id. ß 4(5)(B). 
 146 S. 1805, ß 4(5)(B). 
 147 H.R. 1036, ß 4(5)(A)(iii) (emphasis added).  Compare Robinson v. Howard Bros. of 
Jackson, Inc., 372 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. 1979) (holding that the sale of a pistol to a person 
who certified that he was over twenty-one years of ageóbut whose driverís license 
indicated that he was actually twenty years oldóviolated the Gun Control Act but was 
not the proximate cause of the unforeseeable murder), and Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. 
Corp., 647 P.2d 713 (Haw. 1982) (holding that a gun seller was entitled to summary 
judgment because ìfederal statutes regulating firearm sale did not create a duty on a 
seller in a negligence action nor did it create a private right of action for damagesî), with 
Decker v. Gibson Prods. Co., 679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that whether sale of a 
firearm to a felon whose civil rights were restored and whose purchase was approved by 
sheriff could be reasonably foreseen to result in murder was a question for the jury). 
 148 S. 1805, ß 4(5)(A)(iii). 
 149 In re Jorge M., 4 P.3d 297, 299, 312 (Cal. 2000) (holding that defendant knew or 
should have known that rifle was an ìassault weaponî). 
 150 See State v. Pelleteri, 683 A.2d 555, 557-58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) 
(holding that no scienter element is required regarding assault weapon ban, in that 
ìknowledge of the character of the weapon is not an element of the offenseî).  By contrast, 
federal law requires proof of knowledge of ìthe characteristics that brought [the weapon] 
within the statutory definition.î  Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994).  
ì[T]here is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in 
this country.î  Id. at 610. 
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preclude the types of lawsuits sought to be prohibited. 
The Daschle version would also add to the above language 
clauses explicitly including cases in which a manufacturer or 
seller ìknowingly made any false entry in, or failed to make 
appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept under 
Federal or State law;î151 or aided, abetted, or conspired with any 
person either in making a false statement regarding a fact 
material to the lawfulness of the sale of a qualified product,152 or 
to sell such product, ìknowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe that the actual buyerî was prohibited from receipt of a 
firearm under federal law.153  These are crimes which typically 
would involve sales directly to prohibited persons or ìstraw salesî 
in which a prohibited person obtains a firearm using a proxy to 
conduct the transaction.  Once again, the proximate cause 
requirement would exist for civil liability. 
ì(iv) an action for breach of contract or warranty in 
connection with the purchase of the productî154  Actions for breach 
of contract or warranty arise in diverse circumstancesófor 
instance, a firearm was not delivered when due or did not work 
properly where needed155óbut in this context such conduct is 
exempted from causes of action related to ìthe criminal or 
unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third 
party.î156  While it is unclear what causes of action might arise in 
that context, the exemption for those arising under contract and 
warranty is probably listed just to show that those actions 
generally are unaffected by the bill. 
ì(v) an action for physical injuries or property damage 
resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the 
product, when used as intendedî157  This is the classic strict 
product liability case, and the bill clearly exempts such 
traditional actions.  The Daschle version would add, ìor [when 
used] in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable,î provided that 
ìëreasonably foreseeableí use does not include any criminal or 
unlawful misuse of a qualified product, other than possessory 
offenses.î158  The exclusion of unlawful misuse is consistent with 
 
 151 S. 1805, ß 4(5)(A)(iii)(I) (this is an offense under 18 U.S.C. ß 922(m)). 
 152 Id. ß 4(5)(A)(iii)(II) (such a false statement is an offense under 18 U.S.C. ß 
922(a)(6)). 
 153 Id. ß 4(5)(A)(iii)(III) (such a transfer is an offense under 18 U.S.C. ß 922(d)). 
 154 H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. ß 4(5)(A)(iv) (2003) (emphasis added). 
 155 E.g., Thomas v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1967) (involving situation where a rifle allegedly failed to discharge while the plaintiff 
was hunting big game). 
 156 H.R. 1036, ß 4(5)(A). 
 157 Id. ß 4(5)(A)(v) (emphasis added). 
 158 S. 1805 ßß 4(5)(A)(v), 4(5)(C). 
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traditional legal norms.159  However, it is unclear what effect on 
the lawsuits at issue will stem from the condition that unlawful 
possession may be reasonably foreseeable. 
The Daschle version would add a rule of construction that 
the above exceptions ìshall be construed so as not to be in conflict 
and no provision of this Act shall be construed to create a Federal 
private cause of action or remedy.î160  This is a statement about 
the perils of legal linguistics and how lawyers have the ability to 
twist imperfectly worded rules.  Under this clause, one exception 
would not trump another.  Further, nothing in the enactment 
would create a new basis for actions against the firearms 
industry. 
As noted, the above legislation has a good chance of passage.  
If it does, it will be challenged as beyond Congressí power, 
violative of federalism, and inconsistent with due process.  One 
can be sure that novel theories will be devised to attack the 
firearms industry. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current nationally-orchestrated efforts to suppress the 
firearms industry through litigation is premised on the theory 
that federal and state firearms laws do not go far enough and 
that the industry is to blame for not creating a more perfect 
world than the Congress or the state legislatures have devised.  
Indeed, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, as 
guaranteed by the Second Amendment and most state 
constitutions, and the manufacture and distribution of firearms, 
which are necessary to the exercise of that constitutional right, 
are depicted as being a public nuisance. 
It is hardly a secret that this onslaught of litigation is 
primarily promoted by special interest lobbies that have failed to 
prohibit firearms ownership through the legislative process and 
have turned to the courts to obtain judicial legislation.  While 
most courts have rejected this end run around the democratic 
process, some have embraced an activist role.  Congress would be 
fully warranted in passing preemption legislation to end this 
disruption of a legitimate form of commerce, which is itself a 
penumbra of a basic constitutional right. 
 
 
 159 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability ß 2 cmt. p (1997). 
 160 S. 1805, ß4(5)(D). 
